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Since the turn of the century, the United States, Canada, and Western Europe have 
been moving toward service and information economies and away from an agricultural and 
manufacturing economies (Euromonitor, 1990; Machlup, 1962; Rubin and Huber, 1986; 
Porat, 1977). The fiaction of workers using information to produce economic value has 
been rising, and the fraction working with their hands in factories or on farms has been 
declining. In the United States, the percentage ofjobs in manufacturing fell from 27 
percent in 1920 to 17 percent in 1990. In the European Community, the value-added by 
manufacturing grew at an average annual rate of 6.2 percent from 1960 to 1970, but this 
growth rate was only 0.7 percent from 1980 to 1985. Among white-collar workers, the 
fastest growing occupations have been clerical, professional, and technical workers, and 
managers and administrators (Wolff and Baumol, 1987). 
Six factors have been involved in this shift. First, third-world and developing 
societies have become centers of manufacturing, while the so-called advanced societies 
have shifted toward services. In Europe, the telecommunications sector has been growing 
about 9 to 11 percent annually, and the software and computing services sector has been 
growing 15 to 20 percent annually (Sema Group, 1991). Second, knowledge-intense and 
information-intense products and services have grown rapidly, and the production of 
traditional products has also been using knowledge more intensively. Third, business has 
invested heavily in equipment to support information work. In the United States, 
information-related equipment accounted for 20 percent of capital investment in 1979; this 
figure had become 40 percent of capital investment by 1986. Fourth, knowledge workers 
and information workers have replaced manual production workers within the 
manufacturing sectors. Machine-tool operators, for instance, have oRen been replaced by 
technicians who monitor computer-controlled machine tools. Fifth, workers have 
increased education and information-processing skills (Howell and Wolg 1991). Sixth, 
new kinds of knowledge-intense and information-intense organizations have emerged that 
are devoted entirely to the production, processing, and distribution of information. These 
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new kinds of organizations employ millions of people (Office of Technology Assessment, 
1988). 
As early as 1976, the value of information-sector products and services had 
already exceeded that of the manufacturing sector in the U. S. By 1990, the information 
sector (including services) accounted for $3 out of every $4 of GNP, and over half of the 
U. S. workers were doing some type of information work (Howell and WolfF, 1993; 
Roach, 1988). The U. S., however, represents an extreme case. For instance, in the 
software and computing services sector, the United States has about 55 percent of the 
world market, the European Community has about 25 percent, and Japan has about 8 
percent (Sema Group, 199 1). 
This article surveys information work, information workers, and the computer 
systems that support such work. It then examines the organizations that are most 
dependent on knowledge and information work -- knowledge-intensive firms. 
INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE, AND INFORMATION WORK 
Information is a flow of data that has meaning, and knowledge is a stock (or 
inventory) of information. In one sense, knowledge is to information as assets are to 
income. However, knowledge is more than an accumulation of information: It is an 
organized collection that reflects the intentions of the humans who create and interpret it. 
Thus, knowledge resembles an organized portfolio of assets. 
Some activities draw on extensive knowledge without processing large amounts of 
current information. Management consulting would be one example. Conversely, an 
organization can process much information without using much knowledge. For instance, 
Automatic Data Processing (ADP) produces payroll checks. ADP processes vast amounts 
of information, but it is probably more capital-intensive than knowledge-intensive. 
Producing a payroll check requires little expertise, and many people have this expertise. 
Distinctions between data, information, and knowledge are often difficult to apply. 
From one perspective, ADP merely processes information for other firms, using mainly 
capital in the forms of computers and software. From another perspective, ADP succeeds 
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because it does its specialized task better than its customers can do it themselves. This 
superior performance likely comes fiom both expertise and returns to scale, so knowledge 
and large scale reinforce each other. 
Economists use the term "information workers" to denote everyone who primarily 
creates, works with, or disseminates information (Machlup, 1962; Howell and Wolq 
1993). They include in the information-worker category: (a) clerical workers who mainly 
process data or preserve it without attempting to understand it, (b) clerical workers, 
librarians, and sales personnel who interpret information and act upon it, (c) detectives, 
journalists, and researchers who mainly generate new information, and (d) experts such as 
consultants, lawyers, and certified accountants who mainly apply accumulated knowledge. 
Information workers can be distinguished by their formal educations and cognitive 
skills Perndt et al., 1992; Berndt and Morrison, 1992). Some information workers -- 
such as sales personnel, real-estate agents, and secretaries -- typically do not have 
advanced educational degrees. On the other hand, experts -- such as engineers, judges, 
scientists, writers, and architects -- usually must obtain advanced degrees or professional 
certifications because they exercise independent judgment and creativity based on their 
mastery of specialized knowledge. 
Workers oRen draw distinctions that an outside observer cannot. For instance, 
experts gather information through interviews or reading; they analyze and interpret this 
information; and they make written and oral reports to clients and colleagues. There are 
strong similarities across people, sites, and projects. Nevertheless, some experts say that 
they are applying old knowledge to new problems, others that they are creating new 
knowledge, and still others that they are preserving knowledge that already exists. 
The experts who see themselves as producing new knowledge emphasize the 
recency or originality of their information and the differences between their findings and 
those of predecessors. They may classi@ such work either as basic scientific research or 
as applied research on markets, products, or processes. Other experts see their work 
mainly as applying existing knowledge to current problems. For instance, when most 
lawyers do research, they analyze and interpret previous cases and they emphasize the 
continuity over time of knowledge and its meaning. To gain acceptance of their rulings, 
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most judges de-emphasize the innovative quality of their reasoning. Distinguishing 
between creating knowledge and applying can be difficult. Lawyers may be more 
successfhl if they reinterpret precedent cases imaginatively, or if they conceive original 
strategies. Basic research may have direct applicability, and applied research may 
contribute fhndamental knowledge. When it comes to systems as complex as a human 
body or an economy, people may only be able to create valid knowledge by trying to apply 
it. 
Some experts describe themselves as memory cells. They say their jobs are to 
preserve information that their clients have difficulty preserving. Because the US military 
services rotate assignments frequently, military personnel lack job experience and cannot 
manage long-term projects. Also, military wage scales are too low to attract and retain 
highly educated experts. To compensate, the military services sign contracts with firms 
that provide long-term continuity of management and expertise. These firms employ 
civilian experts who do not rotate assignments frequently and who either manage long- 
term projects directly or advise military managers. 
Creating, applying, and preserving complement each other. At least over long 
periods, merely storing knowledge does not preserve it. For old knowledge to have 
meaning, people must relate it to their current problems and activities. They have to 
translate it into contemporary language and frame it within current issues. Effective 
preserving looks much like applying. As time passes and social and technological changes 
add up, the needed translations grow larger, and applying knowledge comes to look more 
like creating knowledge. Conversely, for new knowledge to have meaning, people must 
fit it into their current beliefs and perspectives, and familiarity with existing knowledge 
signals expertise. Evaluators assess completed research partly by its applicability, and they 
judge research proposals partly by the researchers' mastery of past research. Thus, Rand 
Corporation, which derives some income from research grants, makes elaborate literature 
searches before writing grant proposals. Rand also employs public-information st&, who 
highlight the relevance of research findings. 
In the US, capital investment in information-work machinery -- primarily 
computers and systems -- surpassed investment in traditional capital goods in the 1980s 
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(Hudson Institute, 1987; Office of Technology Assessment, 1988). However, firms have 
found it d i c u l t  to make capital-budgeting decisions about information technology 
because it is so d icu l t  to measure the productivity of information work. It appears that 
information-technology investments in U. S. factories did raise productivity during the 
1980s. On the other hand, in industries like finance, insurance and real estate, huge 
investments in information technology did not increase productivity. The results differed 
vastly biom one firm to another, suggesting that management and organizational design 
were key factors. 
Offie Automation 
Information work concentrates in offices, and office automation systems facilitate 
the processing, distribution, and coordination of information. No longer a mundane 
clerical pool or a "bureaucratic nightmare," the office is one of the most important work 
sites. Offices today house diverse arrays of professional, managerial, sales, and clerical 
employees. Office work is complex and cooperative, and yet highly individualistic. It 
resembles an orchestra of highly-trained individuals who collaborate more than a factory 
of workers who perform preplanned tasks (Laudon and Laudon, 199 1; 1993). 
Ofices perform three critical organizational roles: They coordinate and manage 
the work of professional and information workers at one site. They link the work being 
performed across all levels and functions throughout an organization, They couple an 
organization to its environments, including clients and suppliers (Laudon and Laudon, 
1993). 
To &Ifill these roles, nearly all offices perform five major activities: creating 
documents, filing information, managing projects, coordinating individuals and groups, 
and scheduling individuals and groups. Document management typically consumes about 
40 percent of the total effort, with the other activities splitting the remaining 60 percent in 
roughly equal shares. Further, many offices house specialized experts who perform 
creative tasks such as calculating, drawing, and simulating. 
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The first wave of office automation supported only clerical activities such as word 
processing and simple task coordination, but in the 1990s, new s o h a r e  supports a 
diverse range of office activities. 
Document-Management Technologies support word processing, desktop 
publishing, document imaging, and workflow management. Document-imaging systems 
store, retrieve, and manipulate digitized images of documents. The documents themselves 
can be discarded. Two or more people can work simultaneously on the same document; 
work need not be delayed because a file is out or a document is in transit. Workflow 
systems automate processes such as routing documents to different locations, securing 
approvals, scheduling, and generating reports. With effective indexing, users can retrieve 
files based upon their contents. 
Groupware is software that supports collaboration within work groups. It seeks to 
improve groups' effectiveness by providing electronic links that help them to schedule 
meetings, to meet, to communicate with each other, to develop ideas collaboratively, to 
share the preparation of documents, to share knowledge, and to exchange information on 
the work of members. Groupware usually provides electronic group calendars, electronic 
mail, and software that permits members in remote locations to have video conferences. 
These hnctions presuppose powefil electronic networks. Products such as Lotus Notes, 
Higgins, and Microsoft's Workgroup permit workers to share information and to create 
information-sharing applications. 
Personal Information Managers: Firms have traditionally maintained huge 
corporate databases on mainframe computers, but microcomputers offer office workers 
the opportunity to develop their own personal databases for clients, customers, suppliers, 
or vendors. However, few office workers have created such databases because database 
languages are difficult to use. Instead, software firms are producing personal information 
managers, which are database systems customized for the needs of salespersons, 
managers, real estate agents, or stockbrokers. 
Proiect-Management Software portrays a complex project as an assembly of 
simpler subtasks, each with its own completion time and resource requirements. Once a 
user specifies what each subtask requires, the software can produce delivery schedules and 
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resources allocations. Two project-management techniques are Critical Path Method 
(CPM) and Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT). In the 1990s, project 
managers have begun to use graphical user interfaces that permit workers to operate the 
programs with a mouse. Project managers also have access to high-quality presentation 
graphics, permitting photographic slide and overhead transparency output. Whereas older 
project-management sofhvare focused on single users, contemporary packages offer 
access to many members of a work group. 
Investment Work Stations: Chancellor Capital Management, Inc., developed its 
own investment workstations to help it manage $25 billion for 300 clients. Chancellor's 
former systems were mainframe-based, incompatible, error-prone, and difficult to use. 
They stored data separately in accounting, trading, research, and analytical systems. That 
arrangement compromised data integrity, and it impeded searches for information. Thus, 
Chancellor wanted to reduce drudgery and to give traders and asset managers more time 
to concentrate on making decisions and developing strategies. They wanted to integrate 
their front and back offices so that data-integrity issues would disappear and all systems 
would report identical information. 
Chancellor built a network of powefil workstations that integrate data from the 
firm's investment-management systems and its portfolio-accounting systems. Chancellor 
also installed a user interface with a number of windows; different users have different 
windows, depending upon their own needs. Instead of having to switch from one 
database to another, a user can easily switch from one window to another. Some formerly 
time-consuming calculations have become automatic. Trading within the firm has become 
paperless, as have communications with brokers, and Chancellor can now handle any trade 
volume it wishes. For example, in a few days during September 1992, Chancellor spent a 
large amount of cash, executing 1200 to 1500 trades per day (Michaels, 1993). 
Computer Aided Desian (CAD) automates the creation and revision of designs. 
For instance, Alan R. Bums, a mining engineer from Perth, Australia, used CAD to turn 
an innovative idea into reality. The tires of off-road vehicles take a terrible beating that 
produces frequent tire replacements and costly downtime. Mr. Burns conceived a tire 
with independent tread segments that could be repIaced individually. The segments are 
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not pneumatic so they are not subject to punctures; and people can replace them quickly, 
without removing the wheel from the vehicle. Bums used a CAD workstation to develop 
a visual representation of a segment, and he modified thickness, tread shape, and other 
factors until he achieved an acceptable design. The CAD software enabled him to 
simulate operational characteristics for each visual model and to calculate the tire's 
stresses and strains under specified loading and usage conditions. Once Bums approved a 
design, he used the same software and the same model data to design a mold for the tire 
segments. The software could perform flow analysis to locate potential problems such as 
uneven cooling or shrinkage. One output was instructions for the milling machines that 
cut the mold from tool steel (Shapiro, 1993). 
Virtual Realitv systems offer visualization, rendering, and simulation capabilities 
far beyond those of conventional CAD systems. They use interactive graphics software to 
create computer-generated simulations that are so close to reality that users believe they 
are in a "real" situation. Virtual reality is interactive in such a way that the user actually 
feels immersed in a "world" that exists only in a computer. To enter that world, a user 
dons special clothing, headgear, and equipment. The clothing contains sensors that record 
the user's movements and immediately transmit that information back to the computer. 
For example, Japan's Matsushita Electric Works has developed an virtual-reality 
application it calls Virtual JGtchen to help stores sell kitchen appliances and cabinets. 
Prospective buyers bring their kitchen layouts to a department store, where stafTenter the 
design into a computer. The customers then don the appropriate equipment and suddenly 
find themselves in the kitchen they designed. They can try the appliances in various sizes, 
colors, and locations. They can open and close cabinet doors and drawers. They can 
walk around and discover the feel and ambiance of the new kitchen. 
Although virtual reality may appear fantastic, its benefits may turn out to be very 
concrete. Berlin, Germany, is using virtual-reality equipment to design a new subway 
system. The University of North Carolina is using a virtual-reality system to design a new 
computer-sciences building (Newquist, 1992). Many major pharmaceutical firms are using 
the University of North Carolina's virtual-reality system to create computer- generated 
molecular worlds. General Electric's scientists in Schenectady, New York, are working 
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with surgeons fiom Boston's Brigham and Women's Hospital to develop a virtual-reality 
system for surgery. 
KNOWLEDGE-INTENSIVE EIRMS 
Knowledge has great importance for knowledge-intensive firms W s ) .  KIFs 
derive substantial revenues from products or services that incorporate expertise, and most 
KIFs employ many experts -- such as auditors, computer programmers, consultants, 
researchers, lawyers, market researchers, or medical doctors (Starbuck, 1992). 
KIFs share some similarities in their internal structures and operations, but they 
also differ fiom each other. Sveiby and Lloyd (1987) divided "knowhow companies" into 
categories reflecting their managerial or technical expertise. They said law firms have high 
technical expertise but low managerial expertise, whereas McDonald's fast-food chain has 
high managerial expertise and low technical expertise. On the other hand, Ekstedt (1988; 
1989, pp. 3-9) distinguished "knowledge companies" fiom industrial companies, high- 
technology companies, and service companies "such as hamburger chains". In his schema, 
both high-technology companies and knowledge companies have high knowledge 
intensity, but high-technology companies have higher intensity of real capital than do 
knowledge companies. 
Although KIFs may be professional firms, many KIFs are not professional firms 
because not all experts belong to recognized professions. A profession has at least four 
properties besides expertise: an ethical code, cohesion, collegial enforcement of standards, 
and autonomy (Schriesheim al., 1977). Professionals' ethical codes require them to 
serve clients unemotionally and impersonally, without self-interest. Professionals identi& 
strongly with their professions, more strongly than with their clients or their employers. 
They not only observe professional standards, they believe that only members of their 
professions have the competence and ethics to enforce these standards. Similarly, 
professionals insist that outsiders cannot properly supervise their activities. Management 
consulting and software engineering, for example, do not qualify as recognized professions 
even though the people who do these jobs well have rare expertise. They are not 
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professionals because the ultimate judges of their expertise are their clients or their 
supervisors, and because their employers set and enforce their ethical codes and 
performance standards. 
KDFs form a broader category, in which many issues reflect labor markets, 
interpersonal networks, and experts' individuality, self-interest, and social standing. Yet, 
most KIFs have nearly all the properties that observers have assigned to professional 
firms. For instance, many experts design their own roles, divide work to suit their 
interests, compete for resources, and emphasize autonomy, collegiality, informality, and 
flexible structures. 
Sveiby and Risling (1986) argued that KIFs call for new definitions of ownership 
and new ways of controlling the uses of capital. Traditional notions of ownership, they 
said, assume that financial or physical capital dominates labor, whereas human capital 
dominates in KDFs. 
One should not, however, assume that knowledge resides only in people. Besides 
the knowledge held by individual people, one can find knowledge in: (a) capital such as 
plant, equipment, or financial instruments; (b) firms' routines and cultures; and (c) 
professional cultures. People convert their knowledge to physical forms when they write 
books or computer programs, design buildings or machines, produce violins or hybrid 
corn, or create financial instruments such as mutual-fund shares (Ekstedt, 1988; 1989). 
Organizations seek to capture the knowledge and expertise of their workers in various 
knowledge-based systems -- decision support systems, databases, and case files, some of 
which are automated (Laudon, and Laudon 1993). Conversely, people may gain 
knowledge by reading books, studying buildings, buying shares, or running computer 
programs. People also translate their knowledge into firms' routines, job descriptions, 
plans, strategies, and cultures. Nelson and Winter (1982) treated behavioral routines as 
the very essence of organizations -- the means by which firms can produce predictable 
results while adapting to social and technological changes. Simultaneously, Deal and 
Kennedy (1982) and Peters and Waterman (1982) were saying it is cultures that perform 
these functions. 
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Both KFs  and individuals can gain new expertise by buying capital goods. 
Computer software affords obvious examples. Not long ago, expertise was uneven across 
accountants who handled income taxes. Now, every accountant has low-cost access to 
software that makes no arithmetical errors, omits nothing, incorporates the latest changes 
in tax codes, and warns of conditions that might trigger audits by tax authorities. Lawyers 
have recently begun to use a computer program, CLARA, to help them do legal research. 
CLARA helps small law firms compete more effectively against large firms, and helps 
novice lawyers produce results comparable to experienced lawyers (Laudon and Laudon, 
1991, chapter 4). Although unfinished, CLARA does research nearly as well as law 
professors. On reading of this achievement, one practicing lawyer sniffed: "Too bad. 
Maybe it will get better someday." 
Describing McDonald's as a firm with low technical expertise overlooks the 
expertise in McDonald's technology and organization. McDonald's success stems from its 
ability to deliver consistent quality across diverse environments and despite high turnover 
of low-skilled workers. To get such results, the firm operates extensive training programs 
and conducts research about production techniques and customers' tastes. Although 
training at Hamburger University may give McDonald's managers more skill than those at 
most restaurants, McDonald's managers likely have no more skill than those in most 
production firms. Also, McDonald's uses technology and routines to control workers' 
activities. 
Convertrang Knowledge Into Capital 
KIFs convert individual expertise into organizational property. These conversion 
processes produce at least three types of organizational property: physical capital, 
routines, and organizational culture. 
Physical Capital KIFs may be able to turn expertise into concrete capital. For 
instance, decades of experience enabled the large public accounting firms to create 
systematic auditing procedures. The firms then turned these procedures into checklists 
that novice accountants and clerical staff can complete. Similarly, research occasionally 
produces databases that have value beyond the projects that created them. KIFs exploit 
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these databases by proposing new projects that would draw upon them. So-called 
"knowledge work systems" are investments in information technology that are designed to 
increase a firm's knowledge base (Laudon and Laudon, 1993). 
Converting a K F s  knowledge into capital can fbndamentally alter the nature of the 
firm, turning it into an ordinary production firm and losing its knowledge base while 
strengthening its financial base. For instance, Orlikowski (1988, pp. 179-267) detailed a 
consulting firm's efforts to capture its experience as software. Over ten years and many 
projects, consultants built various software "tools" that help them plan projects and carry 
them out efficiently. The tools originated separately when consultants saw needs or 
opportunities, but the firm's general production philosophy implicitly guided these 
developments and rendered the tools mutually compatible. Also, at first, isolated people 
used these tools voluntarily, but informal norms gradually made their use widespread and 
mandatory. Thus, the tools both expressed the firm's culture in tangible form, and 
reinforced the culture by clarifying its content and generalizing its application. 
Generalization made the differences among clients9 problems less and less important, and 
it weakened the contributions that clients could make to problem solving. Generalization 
also reduced the influence of more-technical consultants and increased the influence of 
less-technical consultants. In their interviews, the consultants stressed the tools' strong 
influence on their perceptions of problems and their methods of solving them. Eventually, 
the firm started to sell the tools to other firms. At that point, the firm's culture, methods, 
and experience became products that other firms could buy. 
Routines Like all other firms, KIFs develop routines to handle familiar situations 
efficiently (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Starbuck, 1983). Routines are a form of social 
capital -- assets that, once learned and honed, become bases success in the marketplace. 
But formalized routines look bureaucratic, and highly educated experts dislike 
bureaucracy: Much research has pointed to conflicts between professions and 
bureaucracies, and some of these conflicts apply to expertise in general (Schriesheim et aI., 
1977). Most experts want autonomy, they want recognition of their individuality, and 
they want their firms to have egalitarian structures. Among the senrice KFs, only those 
having long-term contracts with a very few clients seem able to bureaucratize. Even such 
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KIFs must bureaucratize cautiously, for their expert employees have external job 
opportunities. 
Oryanizational Culture Cultures must be built gradually because they are delicate 
and poorly understood. Building a special organizational culture takes much effort as well 
as imagination. Imitating another firm's culture is usually impossible because every 
culture involves distinctive traditions. 
Maister (1985, p. 4) wrote admiringly of "one-firm firms", which stress 
"institutional loyalty and group effort." In contrast to many of their (often successf%l) 
competitors who emphasize individual entrepreneurship, autonomous profit centers, 
internal competition or highly decentralized independent activities, one-firm firms place 
great emphasis on firmwide coordination of decision making, group identity, cooperative 
teamwork, and institutional commitment. Maister also warned that one-firm firms may 
become complacent, lacking in entrepreneurship, entrenched in their ways of doing things, 
and inbred. 
Orlikowski (1988, pp. 152-160) studied a consulting firm in which the overtly 
"technical training" program knctioned as a culture incubator. Most consultants seem to 
agree with the one who said: "The biggest advantage of the school is the networking and 
socializing it allows. It really is not that important as an educational experience." 
Alvesson (1991; 1992) too described a consulting firm that spent much effort on formal 
socialization. The top managers ran a "project philosophy course." They also sought "to 
sell the metaphor the company as a home to the employees." Designed to foster informal 
interaction, the building has a kitchen, sauna, pool, piano bar, and large lounge area. The 
firm supports a chorus, art club, and navigation course. All personnel in each department 
meet together every second week. Every third month, each department undertakes a 
major social activity such as a hike or a sailing trip. The firm celebrated its tenth 
anniversary by flying all 500 employees to Rhodes for three days of group activities. 
It appears that many KIFs attempt to build cultures by selecting experts carehlly, 
by using teams extensively, developing very serious mission orientations, managing 
growth cautiously, and encouraging open talk. But very few KIFs discourage internal 
competition, emphasize group work, disclose information, and elicit loyalty to the firm. 
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Most KIFs seem to deviate from the one-firm model in having multiple profit centers, 
assessing the productivities of individual experts, revealing only the financial information 
that laws require, decentralizing activities, encouraging entrepreneurship, and not 
involving everyone in decision-making. 
Precarious Monopolies 
Stinchcombe and Heimer (1988) described successfbl software firms as 
"precarious monopolies." They are monopolies insofar as they exhibit unusual abilities. 
Niches evolve naturally as individuals and small groups concentrate on specific streams of 
innovation. The firms also strive explicitly to develop and maintain unusual abilities. 
Unusual abilities help the firms to market their services and to avoid head-on competition. 
This may be a common feature of many KIFs. Many KTFs have unstable 
knowledge monopolies. Stinchcombe and Heimer pointed out that the partial monopolies 
enjoyed by software firms are constantly at risk, both because technological changes may 
make unusual abilities obsolete and because key experts may depart. Computer 
technology has been changing especially rapidly, and the software firms' relations with 
clients and computer manufacturers repeatedly expose their experts to job offers. To sell 
their services to clients, software firms have to publicize the talents of their key experts, 
and this publicity creates job opportunities for the touted experts. 
Professional firms find it especially hard to sustain monopolistic positions because 
the recognized professions work at keeping their control of knowledge and at preserving 
their members' autonomy: KIFs would run into strong opposition if they would try to 
convert professional expertise to organizational property. Moreover, many products of 
professional firms are easy to imitate. For example, Martin Lipton invented the "poison 
pill" defense against unfriendly corporate takeovers; but, after other law firms saw 
examples, Wachtell, Lipton was no longer the sole source for poison pills (Powell, 1986). 
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